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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 4321
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0158
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8063
RUEHGX/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU PRIORITY 9576
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 6911
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0385
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI PRIORITY 0397
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDO/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ BICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T TAIPEI 003306

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STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2026

TAGS: [ETTC](#) [UNSCR](#) [TW](#) [NKWG](#)

SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN RESPONDS, OUTLINES APPROACH

REF: A. STATE 156220

[1](#)B. STATE 155015

[1](#)C. NEELY-HARDIMAN EMAIL 9/20/06

Classified By: AIT Acting Deputy Director Daniel K. Moore, REASONS 1.4
B/C

[1](#)1. (S) Summary: On September 21, AIT delivered to the Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT) Ref A talking points on outstanding export control "gameplan" issues. BOFT's initial reaction was positive. AIT took the opportunity to deliver Ref B comments on export license WA060811144915003. End summary.

[1](#)2. (S) BOFT indicated that it thought the talking points described a practical approach that would allow progress towards the gameplan goals to be achieved in manageable stages. BOFT Export Control Task Force Head Wally Su told AIT that he agreed with Ref A that a logical first step to controlling SCL items transiting/transshipped through Taiwan would be to start collecting detailed manifest data from any ships/cargoes in route to North Korea or Iran.

Undeclared SCL Items Will Be Detained

[1](#)3. (S) Su noted (as previously reported) Taiwan has already announced a requirement effective on September 15 that any item from Taiwan's Sensitive Commodities List (SCL), including the 433 items added since the gameplan was accepted, must have official approval to be shipped via Taiwan ports to North Korea or Iran. In order to start enforcing this requirement, Su indicated that Customs will inspect ships bound for North Korea or Iran, and if any SCL item is found on the ship that was not declared on the ship's manifest, Customs will detain the cargo and fine the shipping company.

Until Technical Problems Resolved

[1](#)4. (S) As part of an early stage of implementation of Taiwan's gameplan commitments, Su said, Taiwan could collect and compile information from the ship manifests on which

companies were involved in trade with North Korea and the types of commodities being traded. He thought that until the November 13-17 U.S.-Taiwan export control discussions resolve the outstanding technical issues related to the difficulty of giving 25-working days advance notice on transit/transshipment licenses, Taiwan authorities would decide after interagency consultation whether or not to allow any manifested SCL item to transit Taiwan and continue on to North Korea or Iran.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs/North Korea and Iran

15. (S) AIT has scheduled a meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular Affairs Bureau for the morning of September 28 to again deliver the ref A talking points and to further discuss how to handle applications for Taiwan visas from current or former DPRK or Iran nationals.

Responses on Specific License Applications

16. (S) AIT took the opportunity to deliver Ref B comments on export license WA060811144915003. BOFT also said it is still waiting for a response to its comments on case WCA060814101242006 relayed via unclass email (Ref C).
WANG